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ABSTRACT 
Both Democrats and Republicans have taken strong positions on wealth 
redistribution. But is there variance within the parties? I hypothesize that while 
moderate non-donors and moderate donors will favor increases in federal 
spending for such policies at similar rates, both liberal and conservative donors 
will be less likely to favor spending due to attachment to their personal wealth. 
This paper analyzes the differences in support for increasing the budgets of five 
wealth redistributive policies while controlling for political donations: public 
schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security. The research 
finds that moderates and moderate donors support do not differ. Liberal non-
donors are more likely to favor increases in spending for public school and Social 
Security, while their donor counterparts favor childcare. Conservative donors are 
consistently less likely than non-donors to favor increases in spending on wealth 
redistributive policies. These findings expose a clear class split amongst 
conservatives and indicates a concerning divide between the Republican political 
elite and the constituents they are supposed to represent.  
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As political parties have become increasingly polarized, so too have many 
politicians’ stances on individual issues. The Republican Party has made it clear 
that they are staunchly against large-scale wealth redistribution, while the 
Democratic Party has made this idea part of the fabric of their party’s platform. Is 
there a clear split only between the parties, or do divisions exist within them? 
Donors tend to be wealthier than the average voter and therefore may have 
different values when it comes to wealth redistributive policies. While it may be 
obvious to assume that liberals will be in favor of wealth redistribution and 
conservatives against it, is there a difference in the level of support for such 
policies between donors and non-donors?  
 This distinction is important because it may reveal that elected officials 
favor the views of their donating constituents over those of non-donating 
constituents. In a political era dominated by campaign contributions, it is critical 
to understand how money affects the policies politicians choose to pursue and 
support. Additionally, wealthier donors may not understand the importance of 
wealth redistributive policies such as aid to the poor, welfare, and Social Security 
because they have never had to rely on it. On a more egalitarian note, it is 
important that all voices are represented in politics in order to ensure that its 
outcomes are representative of its people.  
 This research seeks to identify disparities within political ideologies as 
they pertain to wealth redistributive policies. I hypothesize that while moderate 
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non-donors and moderate donors will favor increases in federal spending for such 
policies at similar rates, both liberal donors and conservative donors will be less 
likely to favor spending than liberal non-donors and conservative non-donors due 
to attachment to their personal wealth. This paper analyzes the differences in 
support for increasing the budgets of five wealth redistributive policies while 
controlling for political donations: public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, 
childcare, and Social Security. The research finds that moderates’ and moderate 
donors’ levels of support do not differ. Liberal non-donors are more likely to 
favor increases in spending for public school and Social Security, while their 
donor counterparts are more likely to favor an increase in spending for childcare. 
Conservative donors are consistently less likely than non-donors to favor 
increases in spending on wealth redistributive policies. These findings expose 
slight differences between liberals non-donors and liberal donors, but more 
significantly, a glaring class split amongst conservatives.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Wealth redistribution was one of the most salient topics of the 2016 presidential 
election. From the left, Senator Bernie Sanders championed redistribution from 
the top 1% to the rest of the country, whose income had largely stagnated. From 
the right, Donald Trump campaigned on tax cuts that would redistribute wealth 
back to middle-class voters. While the issue was addressed from both the 
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Democratic and Republican parties, the two sides of the aisle spoke about the 
issue with different targets for the redistributive efforts and different means by 
which to achieve these goals. Schlozman, Verba and Brady argue that policy 
outcomes are more responsive to high-income voters, who make up the majority 
of political donors (2012). This literature review seeks to reconcile scholarly 
research on wealth redistribution and party polarization to identify the effects, if 
any, of donors on such policy outcomes leading up to the 2016 presidential 
election.  
 Low-income voters are traditionally more likely to have a left-leaning 
political ideology around the world. However, they are less likely to align 
themselves with the left if non-economic party polarization is high. Even if it is 
against their economic interests, low-income voters are often pulled towards the 
right by moral polarization (Finseraas 2009, 296). Henning Finseraas notes that 
“anti-redistributive rightist parties wishing to reduce the extent of redistribution” 
may find distancing themselves from the left on social issues to be an efficient 
strategy in gaining votes (2009, 298). Recently, there has been a global 
conservative shift when it comes to wealth redistribution. Matthew Luttig 
analyzes data presented by Lupu and Pontusson and finds that changes in the 
structure of inequality results in more conservative ideological positions on 
wealth redistribution (Luttig 2013, 817). However, this shift was not consistent 
across all income quintiles. When the ratio between lower quintiles is increased, 
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that quintile becomes more supportive of redistribution. When the ratio between 
higher income quintiles is increased, the highest income quintile becomes three 
times less supportive of redistribution than the lowest income is supportive of it 
(Luttig 2013, 817). That being said, this study was conducted on 14 developed 
countries; the United States was found to be the only outlier. This could be 
because of the U.S.’s exceptionally high concentration of racial minorities in the 
bottom income quintile (Lupu and Pontusson 2011, 329). 
 The U.S could be the outlier because its citizens generally have a positive 
view of people at the low end of this inequality. Bartels finds that, overall, 
Americans give “poor people” an average favorability rating of 73% over “rich 
people”, who score an average of 60% (2008, 36). It should be noted that while 
Americans have a positive view of poor people in general, this view is racially 
charged and tied to an idea of “deserving” versus “undeserving” poor people 
(Gilens 2009). Schneider and Ingram explain that these two categories of people 
have been placed into two socially constructed groups. The “deserving” poor are 
placed in a category that has a positive social construction, but weak political 
power. The “undeserving” poor share weak political power due to a negative 
social construction (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 335-337). This makes it difficult 
for either group to have any effect on policy outcome, and furthermore makes 
poor people rely on more powerful groups to craft the policy surrounding their 
group. 
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Ideals of political and economic equality have long differed in the 
American psyche. Jennifer Hochschild finds that Americans believe in strict 
equality in a political sense, but view “economic freedom as an equal chance to 
become unequal” (Bartels 2008, 28). This results in conflict between firmly held 
egalitarian beliefs and support for policies that exacerbate inequality (Bartels 
2008, 29). Norton and Ariely find that while Americans prefer some degree of 
inequality to perfect economic equality, most Americans vastly underestimate the 
level of existing wealth inequality and construct far more equitable wealth 
distributions in their ideal country (2011, 10). In their survey, Norton and Ariely 
find that citizens who voted for Senator John Kerry in the 2004 election were 
more likely than former President George W. Bush voters to report a higher 
percentage of wealth held by the top 20%. Moreover, when Kerry voters were 
asked to construct an ideal wealth distribution, they gave the top 20% of wealth 
holders less than Bush voters did. Bush voters estimated that the top 20% holds 
less wealth than they actually do, and in their ideal wealth distribution, would 
hold more (2011, 11). These findings indicate that while egalitarian beliefs are 
strong in most Americans, disagreements about the causes of inequality may 
hinder chances for consensus (Norton and Ariely 2011, 12).  
Regardless of the causes of inequality, the existing disparity significantly 
favors the rich when it comes to political representation. Martin Gilens provides 
evidence that policy outcomes of the United States government are more 
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responsive to high-income voters “especially in policy domains where the 
opinions of rich and poor diverge” (Bonica et al. 2012, 118). This is significant 
when considering that Republicans are more sympathetic to tax burdens on the 
rich while Democrats are more sympathetic to tax relief for the poor (Bartels 
2008, 41). Such a split could lead to significant tax cuts for the rich when 
Republicans are in power, followed by increases in the budget for social safety net 
programs when Democrats are in power due to fundamental beliefs held by each 
party.  
The Republican Party values individualism above all else, while the 
Democratic Party values both individualism and egalitarianism, creating potential 
incongruity not present in the Republican Party’s message (Ura and Ellis 2012, 
280). However, both parties have been found to become more liberal in response 
to growing income inequality (Ura and Ellis 2012, 285). The reaction of the two 
parties is not the same; Ura and Ellis find an asymmetric party polarization driven 
predominantly by the preferences of the Republican Party (2012, 288). While the 
authors note that they implicitly neglected the role of political elites in shaping 
polarization, other authors attempt to fill the gaps in information (Ura and Ellis 
2012, 289). Bonica et al. note that rich Americans have been able to influence 
“electoral, legislative, and regulatory processes through campaign contributions, 
lobbying, and revolving door employment of politicians and bureaucrats.” (2013, 
105) The authors note that it is difficult to gauge the effect of monetary 
11 
 
contributions to Democrats on their positions on wealth redistribution, largely 
because the party’s donating base has recently shifted from the traditional small 
number of large donors to a more grassroots system of fundraising (Bonica et al. 
2013, 113). 
Grossman and Hopkins argue that while the parties have clear differences 
on policy issues regarding wealth redistribution, most individual Americans are 
symbolic conservatives but operational liberals (2016). In the context of 
favorability towards poor people, this could mean that Americans are 
symbolically against spending to the poor, yet when presented with a specific 
policy (such as an increase in public school spending), they indicate that they are 
in favor of such a policy. While political ideology is a critical factor in 
understanding the support of wealth redistribution, education levels also play a 
role. When broken down by education levels, those with the lowest levels of 
education were more sympathetic toward the tax burden on rich people and 
unsympathetic toward the tax burden on poor people (Bartels 2008, 41). This 
could be because people with low education levels are less aware of how large the 
wealth disparity is.  
Bonica et al. theorize that either party could implement policies to 
ameliorate the recent sharp rise in inequality, but do not due to extreme 
polarization between the parties, lack of voter participation, feedback from high-
income campaign contributors and the nature of political institutions (2013, 121). 
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This is underlined by an embrace of free market capitalism from both major 
parties in the U.S., which results in lower support for social safety nets that rely 
on wealth redistribution. The parties differ, however, in their general ideological 
drifts. Republicans have become “sharply” more conservative while Democrats 
have shifted only slightly left (Bonica et al. 2013, 106). Even with the shift to the 
left in the Democratic Party, the party has shifted away from social welfare 
policies and towards policies that “target ascriptive identities of race, ethnicity, 
gender, and sexual orientation.” (Bonica et al. 2013, 107) These factors are not 
mutually exclusive with wealth redistribution. In fact, racial minorities are often 
the groups that would benefit most from social welfare policies as they make up 
the largest percentages of the lowest income quintiles.  
The Great Recession of 2008 provided ample political movement on the 
issue of wealth inequality that was ultimately unrealized. As the inequality 
increases, the real value of the minimum wage, taxes on income from capital, the 
top marginal income tax rates, and estate taxes have all fallen (McCarty, Poole, 
Rosenthal 2006, 118). Additionally, there has been little to no political support for 
reforms of the financial sector, substantial reduction of mortgage foreclosures, or 
expansion of investment in human capital of children from low-income 
households (Bonica et al. 2013, 108). Luttig argues that as economic inequality 
increases, support for wealth redistribution policies decreases as those who are in 
a position to influence policy stand to lose as a result of welfare-enhancing 
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policies (2013, 812). This would imply that as contributors to politics become 
richer, their incentive to give to candidates who support wealth redistribution 
declines, making lower-income voters’ voices muffled below the money.  
As party leaders have moved towards extremes, parties as a whole have 
cued voters to vote based on their income (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 
92). Relative income is a statistically significant factor in Republican partisanship. 
The Republican Party has increased the size of its base by moving away from 
redistributive policies as income stratification of voters intensifies (McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 82, 108). McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal write in 
2006 that increases in net worth, wealth, home ownership, and securities 
ownership could be explanatory factors in the diminished desire for social 
insurance and the growth in size of the Republican Party (108). This growth was 
accompanied by a decrease in the party’s favorability outlook on wealth 
redistribution efforts. Despite the right’s distinguished position on social issues, 
from the 1960s to the early 2000s, partisanship by income led to a “rich-poor 
cleavage” between the parties (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 74). While 
every policy issue could be considered from an economic perspective, recent 
elections have focused more on social and moral aspects of myriad issues, such as 
the social issue of increased immigration and the moral issue of legalizing gay 
marriage. Hacker and Pierson highlight the decline of labor unions as a means of 
shaping public opinion among working class voters. They also cite the 
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Democratic Party’s shift from populist elements in order to appeal to affluent 
social liberals, leaving the Republican Party a clear opportunity to recruit those 
voters with promises of “individual gains” from low taxes and small government 
(Nagel and Smith 2013, 162). This may cause low-income voters to vote against 
economic policies that may benefit them, like wealth redistribution (McCarty, 
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 96). 
Democrats are more likely than Republicans to sponsor bills such as 
student loan forgiveness or increases in the minimum wage that are aimed at 
addressing economic inequality (Kraus and Callaghan 2014, 4-5). Non-white 
members of both parties in Congress are more likely to sponsor legislation that 
addresses economic inequality (Kraus and Callaghan 2014, 4). When 
deconstructed, Kraus and Callaghan discover that while Republicans tend not to 
sponsor legislation that addresses wealth redistribution regardless of their 
personal wealth, Democrats are more likely to sponsor the same legislation if they 
are personally of lower wealth (2014, 4). While there was no significant effect for 
gender in Congress as a whole, Democratic women are more likely to sponsor 
legislation addressing economic inequality than their male counterparts (Kraus 
and Callaghan 2014, 4). However, as Congress has continued to be dominated by 
wealthy white men, the legislative branch has “punched the gas pedal” to 
accelerate inequality (Carnes 2016, 107).  
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Despite efforts by the Democratic Party, low-income Americans have 
steadily been shifting right in their political views. Katherine J. Cramer finds that 
this is a result of the increase in national economic inequality. Part of this stems 
from what Cramer labels “rural consciousness,” a mindset adopted by many rural 
dwellers who feel ignored by politics and deprived of the resources they feel they 
deserve (2016, 5). She also points out that the Republican Party was built upon 
anti-New Deal, and therefore anti-wealth redistributive, policies. It is in the 
interest of the party that “attention to class to be diverted to attention to race” 
(Cramer 2016, 16). Most importantly, Cramer argues, is the composition of the 
poor in the United States, who are predominantly racial minorities. This means 
that middle-income voters lack a psychological connection to the poor and are 
therefore less likely to support a redistribution of resources to them (Cramer 2016, 
17).  
Regardless of where low-income citizens lie on the political spectrum, 
they historically do not turn out to vote in large numbers (Bonica et al. 2013, 
110). Perhaps as a result of this, vote-seeking candidates are more responsive to 
political activists than to the median voter (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 
261). This is important because on average, political activists are wealthier and 
less likely to support wealth redistribution policies than the average citizen. Many 
of these political activists donate money to their party and candidates of that 
party, although the income of these donors differs greatly between parties; there is 
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a party split between Democrats and Republicans of $76,000 to $118,000, 
respectively (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 256).  
This gap has a compelling connection to Schlozman, Verba, and Brady’s 
observations on perspectives of economic inequality and political polarization. 
The authors note that “the ideological shift among Democrats derives from the 
increasing liberalism of the most affluent Democrats” (2012, 259). It would then 
seem to follow that party activists, who tend to be wealthier than the average 
party member, would drive the ideological positions of party members as a whole 
to the left. Bonica et al. note that contributions from party activists may have a 
significant impact on legislation that would address economic inequality, such as 
a higher tax rate on carried interest income received by private equity investors 
(2013, 118). Because Republican policies are typically more sympathetic towards 
tax burdens on the rich while Democratic policies are more sympathetic towards 
poor people, their responses to economic inequality will differ significantly 
(Bartels 2008, 41).    
Partisans do not always follow the lead of party activists, however. In 
2012, Republican voters supported tax increases on the wealthy while party 
leaders publicly opposed such legislation (Hershey 2014, 252). However, 
historically speaking, the official party position reflects the view of the majority 
of partisans in the electorate. Party positions can go so far as to obfuscate 
objective conditions, like inflation, that surround economic inequality (Hershey 
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2014, 253-255). Logan Hershey finds that “on a range of issues, scholars find that 
awareness of elite-level differences and the presence of elite debate on an issue 
are the drivers of opinion change in the mass public.” He continues, saying that a 
“major reshuffling of the political environment” could “disrupt the relatively 
stable party attachments in the electorate.” (Hershey 2014, 256) It could be argued 
that in the past few decades, a rise of extremes within each party indicates a future 
such reshuffling. This is caused in part by competitive primaries, in which 
incumbents must become more extreme in order to capture the maximum number 
of votes.  
This shift to extremes manifested in the 2016 presidential election. This 
election cycle was revolutionary in the rhetoric utilized to mobilize voters. On the 
Republican side, Donald Trump campaigned on bringing back American jobs 
from abroad in order to address the sentiments of economic insecurity in the 
middle class. The Democratic response to rising economic inequality was to 
address equal pay across genders, the stagnant minimum wage, universal 
healthcare, and campaign finance reform. Before the 2016 presidential election, 
the Republican Party was characterized, and perhaps caricatured, for being 
supported by predominantly rich, white men, but Donald Trump enfranchised 
low-income voters with many of his stances on social issues. Former Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton, on the other hand, disenfranchised many low-income voters 
with her connections to high-income institutions like Goldman Sachs. This 
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upended the traditional alignment of low-income voters with the Democratic 
Party. However, it is improbable that this shift was sudden or a one-time fluke. 
Rather, it seems more likely that low-income voters have gradually been shifting 
right, a trend that was overlooked by elites as they continued to favor the voices 
of their wealthier constituents.  
Neither the Republican nor the Democratic parties have made significant 
efforts to craft policy aimed at a significant redistribution of wealth. Political 
inaction could be due to extreme party polarization, contributions from wealthy 
donors who do not support redistributive efforts, or a combination of the two in 
which donors cause polarized gridlock on this issue (Finseraas 2009; Schlozman, 
Verba and Brady 2012). Although factors of gender, race, and ethnicity on 
ideological positions regarding wealth redistribution efforts is outside the scope of 
this paper, it is important to note that white, wealthy men in Congress are the least 
likely to support redistribution efforts (Kraus and Callaghan 2014). There appears 
to be a gap in literature that directly addresses the influence that party elites exert 
to steer conversation and policy outcomes on wealth redistribution. In light of the 
historic 2016 presidential election, it is necessary to analyze who steers the 
conversation on redistributive policies in order to assess whether or not the elite 
stance is truly representative of the American people. 
 
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
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This paper seeks to answer the question: is there a difference in levels of support 
for wealth redistributive policies between donors and non-donors of similar 
ideologies? Because donors tend to be wealthier than the average voter, it is 
logical to assume that they may be more conservative in their beliefs on wealth 
redistribution. This is because many wealthy donors believe that they stand to lose 
some of their personal wealth by supporting such policies. Additionally, many 
donors have never benefitted directly from programs that redistribute wealth and 
therefore cannot attest to their ability to help. I posit that donors will generally be 
less likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than non-donors. However, I 
predict that the differences will vary within each ideological category. For this 
reason, I propose three hypotheses regarding the three political ideology 
categories utilized in this study. 
Hypothesis 1: Liberal donors will be less likely to favor wealth 
redistributive policies than liberal non-donors. 
 Because liberal donors are typically wealthier than their non-donor 
counterparts, I predict that the donors will be less likely to favor wealth 
redistributive policies. While donors will preach redistributive policies and 
practices as a part of the larger party platform, they will de facto favor them at 
lower rates than the rest of their party. While Schlozman, Verba, and Brady found 
that Democratic elites are driving the party to the left, I predict that this shift will 
manifest in issues other than wealth redistribution (2012, 259). These findings 
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have the potential to expose a symbolic liberalism within elites in the Democratic 
Party that breaks down to more moderate views when individual items in the 
federal budget are considered.  
Hypothesis 2: Moderate donors will be just as likely to favor 
wealth redistributive policies as moderate non-donors. 
 As the American political party system becomes more polarized, so too do 
donors. This leaves very few donors in the middle of the two parties. Moreover, 
donors often give money to certain candidates and causes because they believe 
strongly in one side or another. Donors also tend to give money in the hopes of 
winning, which leads them to candidates from the two established parties that 
stand a chance at winning national elections. I predict that because many 
moderates do not have strong feelings regarding wealth redistributive policies, 
they and the donors in their category will not have significantly different views.  
Hypothesis 3: Conservative donors will be less likely to favor 
wealth redistributive policies than non-donor conservatives. 
 Conservatives and the Republican Party have positioned themselves 
staunchly against wealth redistributive policies. While most conservative donors 
have never benefitted directly from these policies, many of their constituents 
have. For this reason, I believe that conservative non-donors will be more likely 
to favor wealth redistributive policies when they are framed as individual 
programs (for example, Social Security, childcare, welfare) as opposed to a 
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progressive tax shifting wealth because they are personally familiar with the 
programs. Conservative donors, on the other hand, have the privilege to take a 
strict ideological stance against these programs because they do not rely on any of 
them. Strict conservatism is a “system-justifying ideology, in that it preserves the 
status quo and provides intellectual and moral justification for maintaining 
inequality in society.” (Jost et al. 2003, 63) I therefore predict that conservative 
donors will be strong advocates for the status quo when it comes to wealth 
redistribution policies.   
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The data in this paper comes from the 2012 American National Elections Study 
(ANES) Time Series Study. The unit of analysis in this study is individuals and 
the cases are respondents to the survey. 5,916 respondents were surveyed, so 
N=5,916. The dependent variable for this survey was ideological placement, for 
which survey respondents were sorted into the following categories: liberal, 
moderate, and conservative. These categories came from the NES 7-point liberal-
conservative scale. While this does not measure Democrats, Independents, and 
Republicans exactly, we can assume that most liberal donors will give to 
Democrats and conservative donors to Republicans. Measuring ideological 
positioning is a more helpful variable than party identification because it allows 
22 
 
for an analysis of personal symbolic ideological placement that can then be 
compared to operational ideology.  
 There are five distinct independent variables. Because the term “wealth 
redistribution” is politically charged, a direct question regarding favorability 
towards relevant policies would most likely illustrate a clear partisan split. 
Instead, I decided to measure five policies that redistribute wealth in various, 
concrete ways. These variables include government funding for public schools, 
welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security. In the survey, all 
respondents were asked whether they thought the federal budget for this program 
should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same. Each response received a 
score of zero if the respondent answered “decreased” or “kept about the same.” A 
score of one was applied to respondents that answered “increased.” This scoring 
system is employed because keeping federal aid of these programs the same 
decreases the real value of the budget with inflation, thereby decreasing the 
funding over the long term. These five variables were then compiled into a 
variable henceforth referred to as “social welfare.” Each response to the question 
(should federal spending on [welfare variable] be decreased, kept the same, or 
increased?) received a score of zero, one, or two, respectively. The social welfare 
gives respondents a score from zero to ten based on the sum of their answers to 
the five aforementioned variables, measuring their overall favorability towards 
wealth redistributive policies.  
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This study controlled for political donations. If an individual responded 
yes to giving to individual political candidates, political parties, or both, they were 
considered political donors. This allows for a deeper analysis that goes beyond 
partisan differences in support for wealth redistributive policies. Controlling for 
political donations also allows for a separation of the party elites’ ideology from 
non-donating party members, who may have different stances on the same issues. 
Identifying any differences will give credit to the argument that party elites 
manipulate candidates they donate to while the average voter must adapt to the 
changing party (Hershey 2014, 256).  
The analysis will begin with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of 
social welfare in order to analyze the difference between parties and their donors 
on a general level. From there, each individual contributing variable to the social 
welfare category (Social Security, welfare, childcare, public school, and aid to the 
poor) will be analyzed via logistic regressions. One general logistic regression 
will be done for all six categories of survey respondents: liberal, liberal donor, 
moderate, moderate donor, conservative, and conservative donor. From there, a 
logistic regression will be performed to analyze the differences between the 
donors and non-donors of each specified ideology.  
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
General 
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Table A (see Appendix) illustrates the frequency of liberals, liberal donors, 
moderates, moderate donors, conservatives, and conservative donors. For each 
ideological affiliation, there were significantly lower numbers of donors than 
there were non-donors. Table 1 demonstrates the average social welfare score of 
each of the six groups. Each survey respondent received a score of zero, one, or 
two based on their support for a decrease, maintenance of the same, or increase, 
respectively, in the federal budget for each separate category included in the 
social welfare scale (public school, welfare, childcare, aid to the poor, and Social 
Security). A mean score of zero indicates that the group wants to decrease the 
federal budget in all measured aspects of social welfare and ten means the group 
wants to increase the budget for all five categories. 
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Table 1: Mean score of the six categories of 
respondents on the social welfare scale. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 6.952584 1460 1.926986 
Liberal Donors 7.118597 268 2.005978 
Moderate 6.231209 932 2.088464 
Moderate Donors 5.982533 77 2.041533 
Conservative 5.117015 2209 2.434877 
Conservative Donor 3.832257 277 2.537898 
Total 5.876123 5221 2.412499 
 
Based on Table 1, it is possible to see the polarization in the liberal and 
conservative donor groups. Liberal donors receive the highest average score of 
7.12 while their non-donor counterparts receive a 6.95. On the other side, 
conservative donors receive the lowest mean score of 3.83, which is lower than 
their non-donor counterparts’ score of 5.11. Moderate non-donors received a 
mean score of 6.23, while moderate donors averaged a more conservative score of 
5.98. When an OLS regression is performed, it is possible to see the significant 
difference between these means (Table B). Liberals vary significantly from 
moderates, conservatives, and conservative donors. However, they do not vary 
significantly from their donor counterparts (Table C). Table D illustrates a lack 
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of significant difference between moderates and moderate donors. Table E, on 
the other hand, shows a significant difference between conservatives and 
conservative donors, with conservative donors scoring lower on the social welfare 
scale.   
Public School 
When broken down into individual categories, the differences between ideologies 
and the donors that adhere to them becomes clearer. Respondents were asked if 
they thought federal spending on public schools should be increased, decreased, 
or kept about the same. If the response was “decreased” or “kept about the same,” 
the answer was assigned a zero. If the response was “increased,” the answer was 
assigned a one. Table F illustrates the odds ratio of each of the six categories of 
respondents’ views to changes in federal spending on public schools. An odds 
ratio conveys “by how much the odds of the outcome of interest occurring change 
for each unit change in the independent variable” (Pollock and Edwards 2018, 
168). Table 2 makes clear that liberals (with an odds ratio of 4.115, as seen in 
Table F) are much more likely to support increasing the federal budget for public 
schools than any other group.  
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Table 2: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
 the federal budget for public schools. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.8045086 1480 0.3967125 
Liberal donor 0.7431517 270 0.4377072 
Moderate 0.6287281 942 0.4834016 
Moderate donor 0.6947676 84 0.4632562 
Conservative 0.5335028 2281 0.4989857 
Conservative donor 0.2971352 286 0.4577970 
Total 0.6258352 5344 0.4839518 
 
Moderate donors (with a score of 1.344) are the only other group to favor an 
increase. Liberal donors, moderates, conservatives, and conservative donors 
favored either maintenance of the status quo or decrease in the federal budget.  
Table G gives the results from a logistic regression that considers all six 
categories of respondents with “liberal” serving as the intercept. It is clear from 
the P-values (“Pr(>|t|)” on the table) that there is a significant difference between 
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Does this mean that donors do not hold 
significantly different opinions on federal spending on public schools from 
liberals? This seems improbable. It more likely means that being a donor does not 
make an individual hold significantly different opinions than their non-donating 
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counterparts. In order to ensure that this interpretation was correct, the data from 
Table G was broken down into three separate logistic regressions (Table H, Table 
I, Table J) to measure the significance in difference between liberals and liberal 
donors, moderates and moderate donors, and conservative and conservative 
donors, respectively. Liberals and liberal donors vary with a p-value of 0.1 (a 
value just short of conventional levels of statistical significance), with liberal non-
donors being less likely to favor an increase in the federal budget for public 
schools (Table H). Table I illustrates a lack of significant difference between 
moderates and moderate non-donors. In Table J, it is possible to see that 
conservatives and conservative donors differ significantly in their opinions on 
federal spending on public schools. Conservative donors are significantly more 
likely to favor keeping the federal budget about the same or decreasing it than 
their non-donor counterparts.  
Welfare 
Interestingly, all groups scored below 0.26 (on a scale of zero to one) when asked 
about an increase in the federal budget for welfare (Table 3). This ranged from a 
0.252 from liberal donors to a 0.056 from conservative donors, an illustration of 
the argument that donors tend to be more extreme in their views than their non-
donor counterparts. This implies a general lack of support for welfare spending or 
dissatisfaction with the program as a whole. Table 3 shows a comparison of the 
means across the six groups of respondents.  
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Table 3: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for welfare. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.21592363 1473 0.4116013 
Liberal donor 0.25187830 270 0.4348984 
Moderate 0.13303709 942 0.3397952 
Moderate donor 0.09268711 83 0.2917518 
Conservative 0.07599589 2267 0.2650500 
Conservative donor 0.05636867 286 0.2310367 
Total 0.13294683 5321 0.3395492 
 
The odds ratio for responses to welfare spending illustrate that liberal 
donors have the most positive response to an increase in spending, although their 
score is still low (Table K). Similar to the response for federal spending on public 
schools, Table L shows a highly significant difference between liberals, 
moderates, and conservatives when it comes to welfare. Tables M, N, and O 
illustrate that there is no significant difference between liberals and liberal donors, 
moderates and moderate donors, and conservatives and conservative donors, 
respectively. However, it is interesting to note that not a single category of donors 
received a significantly different score than their non-donating counterparts. This 
could be because of effectiveness in messaging from the parties that represent 
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liberals and conservatives. More likely, it is indicative of an overall lack of 
support for the program.  
 The results from the logistic regression on welfare seem to tie back into 
the argument posed by Gilens that poor people can either be “deserving” or 
“undeserving” (1999). The hoops that people must jump through to obtain welfare 
benefits (for example, drug testing) seem to imply that they are not trusted to use 
the system properly and therefore “undeserving” of such wealth redistribution 
efforts. Alternatively, Schneider and Ingram would argue that welfare recipients 
have been placed in a socially constructed group that is both viewed negatively 
and given weak political power, leading those with power to not support the 
program as a whole (1993).  
Aid to the Poor 
Similar to the results for welfare spending, liberal donors and conservative donors 
represented the extremes on the mean scores scale in regard to the federal budget 
for aid to the poor (Table 4).  
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Table 4: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for aid to the poor. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.4953054 1480 0.5001469 
Liberal donor 0.5307258 271 0.4999786 
Moderate 0.4008793 943 0.4903366 
Moderate donor 0.3815680 84 0.4886966 
Conservative 0.2499604 2259 0.4330857 
Conservative donor 0.1541460 287 0.3617192 
Total 0.3561007 5325 0.4788905 
 
The odds ratio for this data indicates that the odds of favoring an increase in 
spending on the poor for liberal donors was 15% higher than that of a non-liberal 
donor, while the odds of a conservative donor were 85% lower than a non-
conservative donor (Table P). Table Q illustrates significant differences between 
liberals, moderates, and conservatives. When broken down by ideology, logistic 
regressions yielded no significant different between liberals and liberal donors, 
nor between moderates and moderate donors (Table R, Table S). There was a 
strong significant difference between conservatives and conservative donors (with 
a P-value below 0.01), in which conservative donors were less likely to favor an 
increase in the federal budget for aid to the poor (Table T).   
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Childcare 
When asked about federal spending on childcare, the groups again illustrated 
significant differences in their values. Once again, liberal donors had the highest 
means score while conservative donors had the lowest mean score (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for childcare. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.4628661 1481 0.4987876 
Liberal donor 0.5404033 270 0.4992918 
Moderate 0.3250649 944 0.4686474 
Moderate donor 0.2300255 77 0.4236041 
Conservative 0.2494619 2261 0.4327974 
Conservative donor 0.1507043 286 0.3583885 
Total 0.3314778 5317 0.4707887 
 
The odds ratio for federal spending on child care reinforces this information, 
illustrating that liberal donors are the only group that are more likely to favor an 
increase in spending than not (Table U). Table V illustrates strong differences 
between most of the groups. When broken down by ideology, it is shown that 
liberal donors are more likely to favor an increase in federal spending on 
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childcare than their non-donor counterparts, although the P-value falls just short 
of conventional levels of statistical significance (Table W). As with the previous 
variables, there was no difference between moderates and moderate donors on the 
issue of child care (Table X). However, there was a highly significant difference 
between conservatives and conservative donors, with conservative donors being 
less likely to favor an increase in federal spending on child care (Table Y).  
Social Security 
Interestingly, liberal donors did not score the highest when it came to federal 
spending on Social Security (Table 6). In fact, liberals were the only group to 
have an odds ratio above a value of one, meaning that the odds of a liberal 
respondent supporting an increase in the budget for Social Security were 16.8% 
higher than a non-liberal (Table Z). Unlike welfare, Social Security is not a 
means-tested program and as such, it not typically viewed as a program for the 
poor. Unlike welfare, the beneficiaries of Social Security are not a part of a 
negatively viewed social group. Therefore, the program as a whole receives 
higher favorability ratings. 
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Table 6: Mean values of responses to an increase in 
the federal budget for Social Security. 
 Mean N Std. Dev. 
Liberal 0.5387621 1474 0.4986645 
Liberal donor 0.4629038 269 0.4995501 
Moderate 0.5311211 943 0.4992955 
Moderate donor 0.4232112 84 0.4970192 
Conservative 0.4491807 2269 0.4975204 
Conservative donor 0.2531787 284 0.4356008 
Total 0.4783288 5322 0.4995771 
 
While most groups responded close to the mean of 0.478, there was 
significant variance among ideological categories (Table AA). For liberals, non-
donors were slightly less likely to support an increase in the federal budget for 
Social Security (Table AB). For moderate donors and non-donors, there was no 
significant difference (Table AC). Conservatives had the largest and most 
significant differences. Conservative non-donors hovered just slightly below the 
mean of 0.478, but conservative donors were significantly less likely to favor an 
increase in spending on Social Security at 0.253 (Table AD).  
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DISCUSSION 
When analyzed by variable (public school, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and 
Social Security), it is simple to see that there are significant differences in 
ideology between liberals, moderates, and conservatives. However, do the 
differences persist when controlling for political donations? The answer for 
moderates is a resounding no. There was not a single category in which moderates 
held significantly different beliefs from their donating counterparts. It is important 
to note that the number of “moderate donor” responses was always the lowest of 
the six categories. This could be because donors tend to give money because of 
strongly held beliefs that generally represent strong, polarized views (Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady 2012). This results in the donors picking a party that will 
champion their strongly held beliefs, which generally leads them to the 
Democratic or Republican Parties. These results strongly support Hypothesis 2, 
which predicted that moderate donors would be just as likely to favor wealth 
redistributive policies as moderate non-donors.  
The differences between liberals and liberal donors are more pronounced. 
There were no significant differences between liberals and liberal donors in 
regard to support for an increase in federal spending on welfare or aid to the poor. 
In two categories (public school and Social Security), liberal donors were less 
likely (with a P-value of 0.1, which falls short of conventional standards of 
significance) to favor an increase in federal spending when compared to their non-
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donor counterparts. This could be because there are fewer donors than non-donors 
who directly benefit from these services. Wealthy donors may have gone to or 
have children in private schools. Additionally, they may not need to rely on Social 
Security. However, donors were more likely to favor an increase in federal 
spending on childcare (again at the 0.1 level). This could be because wealthier 
donors with children would directly benefit from such a service. These findings 
do not support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that liberal donors would be less 
likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than liberal non-donors. While this 
was true for public school and Social Security, it did not hold true across all five 
categories.  
Conservatives, however, had statistically significant differences in levels 
of support for social welfare spending than their donating counterparts. There was 
only one category in which conservatives and conservative donors did not have 
significantly different values: welfare spending. In the categories of federal 
spending on public school, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security, 
conservative donors were consistently less likely to favor an increase in spending. 
This strongly supports Hypothesis 3, which posited that conservative donors 
would be less likely to favor wealth redistributive policies than non-donor 
conservatives. The implications of these findings are important in understanding 
how the Republican Party has shifted dramatically right over the past few decades 
while the Democratic Party has only gradually shifted left (Grossman and 
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Hopkins 2016). These findings indicate that conservative donors are controlling 
the direction of the party while non-donors’ more moderate views are being 
drowned out by party elites. This should be important to political scientists in 
understanding ideological trends on wealth redistributive policies and to elected 
officials who may not be representing their average constituents’ views on wealth 
redistributive policies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This research asked if there was a significant difference between donors and non-
donors when it came to support for wealth redistributive policies. By scoring 
responses to the 2012 ANES Time Series Study for support of increased funding 
for public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and Social Security, it was 
possible to run logistic regressions to determine whether such a significant 
difference exists. Because donors tend to be high-income voters, I posited that 
liberal donors and conservative donors would be less likely to support wealth 
redistributive policies than their non-donating counterparts due to an attachment 
to their personal wealth. That being said, because there are few causes that court 
moderate donors, I hypothesized that moderate donors and non-donors would not 
differ significantly in their views. I found that moderates and just as likely to 
favor wealth redistributive policies as moderate non-donors. Liberal donors are 
more likely to favor an increase in spending for childcare than liberal non-donors, 
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who are more likely to favor an increase in public school and Social Security 
spending. In every category but welfare spending, conservative donors were less 
likely to favor an increase in spending on wealth redistributive policies.  
These findings support McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal’s observation that 
the Republican Party has increased its base by moving away from redistributive 
policies (2006, 82, 108). This could be because, as Cramer argues, the 
composition of the poor in the United States results in a lack of connection 
between them and middle- and high-income voters (2016, 17). If middle- and 
high-income voters are the majority of party activists, and vote-seeking 
candidates are more responsive to party activists than the median voter, how do 
activists shape the policy outcomes regarding wealth redistribution (Schlozman, 
Verba, and Brady 2012, 261)? This paper adds to existing literature by offering 
evidence that Republican elites want to shape these policies to be far more 
conservative than even conservative non-donors. Because Republicans are 
currently in control of the executive and legislative branches, they could use their 
power to make dramatic slashes to social safety net programs. Just as important is 
the contribution of further evidence of the class divide within the Republican 
Party that Democrats could exploit or—without external intervention—could 
cause a split between conservatives. 
Future research should consider utilizing additional dependent variables to 
federal budget spending on public schools, welfare, aid to the poor, childcare, and 
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Social Security. Alternatively, a further analysis of the amount of money donated 
(as opposed to a binary “yes” or “no”) and the scaled effects on candidates’ 
positions on wealth redistribution could prove to be illuminating. Holding these 
findings to data from the 2016 presidential election could establish a trend in 
wealth redistribution policies as the issues become increasingly salient. The sheer 
amount of money in politics implies that political elites are out of touch with their 
poor constituents that would benefit the most from these policies. More 
importantly, the country as a whole would benefit if concrete steps were made to 
lift America’s lowest classes.     
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A: Frequency of the six categories of respondents. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Liberal 1525 25.778 28.362 
Liberal Donor 321 5.426 5.970 
Moderate 963 16.278 17.910 
Moderate donor 113 1.910 2.102 
Conservative 2143 36.224 39.855 
Conservative donor 312 5.274 5.802 
NA’s 539 9.111  
Total 5916 100.000 100.000 
 
 
Social Welfare Tables 
 
Table B: OLS regression results for social welfare by category of respondent. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) 6.95258 0.06740 103.157 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal donor 0.16601 0.18056 0.919 0.358 
Moderate -0.72137 0.11229 -6.424 1.44e-10 *** 
Moderate donor -0.24868 0.26684 -0.932 0.351 
Conservative -1.83557 0.09663 -18.996 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -1.28476 0.19820 -6.482 9.88e-11 *** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table C: OLS regression results for social welfare between liberal non-donors 
and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal 6.95258 0.06740 103.157 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal donor 0.16601 0.18056 0.919 0.358 
 
 
Table D: OLS regression results for social welfare between moderate non-donors 
and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderate 6.23121 0.08981 69.384 < 2e-16 *** 
Moderate donor -0.24868 0.26684 -0.932 0.351 
 
44 
 
Table E: OLS regression results for social welfare between conservative non-
donors and conservative donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservative 5.11701 0.06924 73.901 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -1.28476 0.19820 -6.482 9.88e-11 *** 
 
 
Public School Tables 
 
Table F: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
public schools. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 4.115 3.469 4.882 
Liberal donor 0.703 0.475 1.040 
Moderate 0.411 0.322 0.526 
Moderate donor 1.344 0.736 2.454 
Conservative 0.278 0.227 0.341 
Conservative donor 0.370 0.265 0.516 
 
 
Table G: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) 1.4147 0.0872 16.223 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal donor -0.3523 0.1996 -1.765 0.0776 . 
Moderate -0.8880 0.1256 -7.071 1.74e-12 *** 
Moderate donor 0.2957 0.3072 0.963 0.3357 
Conservative -1.2805 0.1043 -12.277 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -0.9952 0.1702 -5.847 5.31e-09 *** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table H: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal 1.4147 0.0872 16.223 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal Donors -0.3523 0.1996 -1.765 0.0776 . 
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Table I: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates 0.52676 0.09037 5.829 5.90e-09 *** 
Moderate Donors 0.29574 0.30717 0.963 0.335699 
 
 
Table J: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on public schools between conservative non-donors and conservative 
donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives 0.13421 0.05722 2.346 0.019030* 
Conservative Donors -0.99519 0.17021 -5.847 5.31e-09*** 
 
 
Welfare Tables 
 
Table K: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
welfare. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 0.275 0.234 0.324 
Liberal donor 1.223 0.829 1.804 
Moderate 0.557 0.411 0.755 
Moderate donor 0.666 0.277 1.600 
Conservative 0.299 0.230 0.389 
Conservative donor 0.726 0.361 1.462 
 
 
Table L: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) -1.28958 0.08277 -15.580 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal Donor 0.20096 0.19843 1.013 0.311211 
Moderate -0.58479 0.15497 -3.773 0.000163 *** 
Moderate Donor -0.40689 0.44731 -0.910 0.363058 
Conservative -1.20846 0.13425 -9.002 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative Donor -0.31978 0.35679 -0.896 0.370144 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
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Table M: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal -1.28958 0.08277 -15.580 < 2e-16 *** 
Liberal Donors 0.20096 0.19843 1.013 0.311211 
 
 
Table N: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates -1.8744 0.1310 -14.306 < 2e-16 *** 
Moderate Donors -0.4069 0.4473 -0.910 0.363058 
 
 
Table O: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on welfare between conservative non-donors and conservative donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -2.4980 0.1057 -23.635 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.3198 0.3568 -0.896 0.370144 
 
 
Aid to the Poor Tables 
 
Table P: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on aid 
to the poor. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 0.981 0.855 1.127 
Liberal donor 1.152 0.828 1.603 
Moderate 0.682 0.545 0.853 
Moderate donor 0.922 0.516 1.648 
Conservative 0.340 0.281 0.410 
Conservative donor 0.547 0.367 0.816 
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Table Q: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) -0.01878 0.07045 -0.267 0.789830 
Liberal donor 0.14184 0.16841 0.842 0.399692 
Moderate -0.38302 0.11448 -3.346 0.000826 *** 
Moderate donor -0.08110 0.29641 -0.274 0.784408 
Conservative -1.08004 0.09641 -11.203 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -0.60362 0.20400 -2.959 0.003101 ** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table R: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal -0.01878 0.07045 -0.267 0.789830 
Liberal donor 0.14184 0.16841 0.842 0.399692 
 
 
Table S: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor between moderate non-donors and moderate donors.  
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates -0.40180 0.09023 -4.453 8.63e-06 *** 
Moderate Donors -0.08110 0.29641 -0.274 0.784408 
 
 
Table T: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on aid to the poor between conservative non-donors and conservative 
donors.  
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -1.09882 0.06581 -16.696 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.60362 0.20400 -2.959 0.0031 ** 
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Childcare Tables 
 
Table U: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
childcare. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 0.862 0.751 0.989 
Liberal donor 1.364 0.981 1.899 
Moderate 0.559 0.445 0.702 
Moderate donor 0.620 0.345 1.115 
Conservative 0.386 0.319 0.466 
Conservative donor 0.534 0.353 0.806 
 
 
Table V: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) -0.14881 0.07045 -2.112 0.03472 * 
Liberal donor 0.31078 0.16861 1.843 0.06535 . 
Moderate -0.58178 0.11636 -5.000 5.92e-07 *** 
Moderate donor -0.47758 0.29920 -1.596 0.11050 
Conservative -0.95267 0.09640 -9.882 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservative donor -0.62760 0.21035 -2.984 0.00286 ** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table W: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal -0.14881 0.07045 -2.112 0.03472 * 
Liberal Donors 0.31078 0.16861 1.843 0.06535 . 
 
 
Table X: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates -0.7306 0.0926 -7.889 3.66e-15 *** 
Moderate Donors -0.4776 0.2992 -1.596 0.11050 
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Table Y: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on childcare between conservative non-donors and conservative donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -1.1015 0.0658 -16.740 < 2e-16 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.6276 0.2104 -2.984 0.00286 ** 
 
 
Social Security Tables 
 
Table Z: Odds ratio results of responses to an increase in federal spending on 
Social Security. 
 Odds Ratio 2.5% 97.5% 
Intercept (liberal) 1.168 1.016 1.343 
Liberal donor 0.738 0.529 1.029 
Moderate 0.970 0.778 1.209 
Moderate donor 0.648 0.374 1.122 
Conservative 0.698 0.583 0.835 
Conservative donor 0.416 0.295 0.585 
 
 
Table AA: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept (liberal) 0.15536 0.07116 2.183 0.0291 * 
Liberal donor -0.30402 0.16952 -1.793 0.0730 . 
Moderate -0.03071 0.11236 -0.273 0.7846 
Moderate donor -0.43425 0.28049 -1.548 0.1216 
Conservative -0.35934 0.09157 -3.924 8.82e-05 *** 
Conservative donor -0.87775 0.17416 -5.040 4.81e-07 *** 
Significance codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 ‘.’ 
 
 
Table AB: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security between liberal non-donors and liberal donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Liberal 0.15536 0.07116 2.183 0.0291 * 
Liberal Donors -0.30402 .16952 -1.793 0.0730 . 
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Table AC: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security between moderate non-donors and moderate donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Moderates 0.12465 0.08696 1.433 0.15181 
Moderate Donors -0.43425 0.28049 -1.548 0.12164 
 
 
Table AD: Logistic regression results for responses to an increase in federal 
spending on Social Security between conservative non-donors and conservative 
donors. 
 Estimate Std. Error T value Pr(>|t|) 
Conservatives -0.20398 0.05764 -3.539 0.000405 *** 
Conservatives Donors -0.87775 0.17416 -5.040 4.81e-07 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
